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Abstract: This paper analyzes the thought on science and religion of two thinkers that 
share essentially the same position: Stephen Jay Gould and Karl Popper. We first make 
a comparison between those passages of their works where this similarity emerges 
more explicitly. We then recall some of the critiques that have been extended to Gould 
on this topic; they can be extended to Popper as well. Moreover, we highlight another 
critical issue—taken from evolutionary theory—that Gould’s theorization is not able to 
handle adequately from the theological standpoint. We finally place Gould’s proposal 
inside Barbour’s fourfold typology for the science-religion relationship, and we conclude 
by recommending further critical reflection on these interdisciplinary issues.
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Introduction
According to Ian Barbour, the different ways in which the relation between 
science and religion is usually conceived can be categorized by means of 
a fourfold typology: conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration 
(Barbour 1998, 77–105). The debate on this topic is nowadays very complex 
and rich, and various epistemological frameworks have been put forth to 
modify or revise the one originally proposed by Barbour (see for instance 
Peters 1998; Stenmark 2004b; Murray 2009). For present purposes, we will 
nonetheless refer to these four options. The aim of this paper is, first of all, 
to make an introductory comparison of the ideas on science and religion of 
two very well-known thinkers. The first one, Stephen Jay Gould († 2002), was 
a famous paleontologist and an incredibly prolific popularizer. The second, 
Karl Popper († 1994), has been one of the most important philosophers of 
science of the twentieth century. These two authors have elaborated an 
essentially equivalent position on this topic, the latter almost sixty years 
before the former. Indeed, both agree in criticizing the first option—the 
conflict thesis—and maintain that science and religion are independent 
enterprises. This commonality is significant, and is worth investigating in 
more detail.
Karl Popper dealt with the relationship between science and religion 
on the occasion of a lecture entitled “Science and Religion”, held in New 
Zealand in the year 1940; the broader context was a “discussion course” on 
“Religion: Some Modern Problems and Developments”. This essay can be 
found in the Popper Archive at the Hoover Institution, cyclostyled and with 
handwritten revisions by the author which concern only the style and not the 
content (Popper 2008, 432–433). It remained unpublished for many years, 
to finally appear in the collection After the Open Society: Selected Social and 
Political Writings. In this book, it is followed by an interview with Edward 
Zerin that dates back to 1969, and that was published after his death, in 1998 
(Popper 2008, 48–52). On the other hand—almost sixty years later but nine 
years before the publication of Popper’s aforementioned essay—Stephen Jay 
Gould published a short book on the same topic, named Rocks of Ages: Science 
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and Religion in the Fullness of Life (2002 [1999]). After a brief comparison of 
these two works, we will shortly recall some of the critiques that have been 
extended to Gould on this topic. These critiques, because of the similarities 
between the two proposals, can be extended to Popper as well. A second 
aim of this work is to further foster critical reflection on interdisciplinary 
issues, moving from these two authors’ viewpoint.
In this context, the thought of the Spanish philosopher of science 
and science and religion scholar Mariano Artigas († 2006) intersects with 
both these authors. Indeed, he devoted a considerable part of his career as 
a philosopher of science to an in-depth study and clarification of Popper’s 
philosophical proposal (Artigas 1979; 1998; 1999; 2002). Furthermore, 
as a scholar of science and religion, he tackled the view of Stephen Jay 
Gould on this topic in a paper written in Spanish (Artigas 2005). Moreover, 
chapter two of his Oracles of Science: Celebrity Scientists versus God and 
Religion—co-authored with Karl Giberson—is dedicated to Gould, and its last 
section deals with Gould’s thought on science and religion (Giberson and 
Artigas 2007, 79–85). Therefore, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary 
of Artigas’s death, this paper offers a comparison, and a short analysis, of 
a specific aspect of the thought of two important authors that inhabited 
his intellectual landscape.
1. A Brief Comparison
In analyzing the two works under scrutiny, it can be clearly recognized 
that both Gould and Popper agree in thinking that there is no intrinsic and 
inevitable conflict between science and religion. The fundamental concern in 
articulating their position is to show that conflicts originated and originate 
when, whether moving from the scientific or the religious area, trespasses 
occur. If scientists go beyond the description and explication of the natural 
world, and reason about how human beings should behave by referring to 
their science, they trespass beyond their own area of expertise. If, on the 
other hand, religious people try to explain factual things, whose explication 
pertains to science, by referring to their own religious beliefs, they too 
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trespass beyond their borders (Popper 2008, 41). In a concise passage at 
the beginning of his book, Gould offers a brief description of both science 
and religion: “Science tries to document the factual character of the natural 
world, and to develop theories that coordinate and explain these facts. 
Religion, on the other hand, operates in the equally important, but utterly 
different, realm of human purposes, meanings, and values” (Gould 2002, 
4). Gould famously labels the two different areas of science and religion 
“magisteria”. And, in affirming that the two don’t overlap, he introduces 
the acronym NOMA—Non-Overlapping Magisteria (Gould 2002, 5)1. The two 
domains have different methodologies, and different purposes: “Each domain 
of inquiry frames its own rules and admissible questions, and sets its own 
criteria for judgement and resolution. These accepted standards, and the 
procedures developed for debating and resolving legitimate issues, define 
the magisterium—or teaching authority—of any given realm” (Gould 2002, 
52–53). Science and religion are then—from this point of view—distinguished 
both logically and methodologically (Gould 2002, 59). Gould in his book 
states that religion deals with the ethical topics concerning what “should 
be”, while the scientific enterprise is engaged in the search for the objective 
“is” of the natural world. We will not discuss here the classic philosophical 
issue of so-called is/ought divide, and the debates over what has been called 
the “naturalistic fallacy” (i.e. the deduction of a moral prescription from 
the simple description of a natural state of affairs)2. But it is worthwhile to 
highlight here that also Karl Popper, in his lecture, deals with the relation 
between descriptive and normative judgements. In his case, the object is 
the relative weight to be assigned to the two different categories:
There have, of course, been people who dogmatically asserted that there is 
nothing beyond the scope of science and accordingly that such statements as 
“He ought to do this” are not statements at all but form a meaningless jumble of 
words […]. And their insistence on the lack of meaning of the ought-sentences 
1 This term appears as the title of one of Gould’s monthly essays in Natural History: “Non-
overlapping Magisteria” (Gould 1997). This essay has successively been included in Gould 
(2011 [1998]).
2 Gould devotes to this topic a long note that goes from page 55 to page 57.
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seems to mean only that the ought-sentences are not of a scientific character. 
In fact we can simply say that these people use “meaningless” as a synonym 
for “non-scientific”, so that their whole theory can also be expressed in the 
words “Ought-sentences are non-scientific”, which is exactly what I maintain 
here. (Popper 2008, 44)
Popper affirms that scientific answers are always descriptive in nature 
(Popper 2008, 44). He adds that science is able to describe human behavior 
too (Popper 2008, 45). But he thinks as well that a moral decision “cannot 
be derived from any scientific statement” (Popper 2008, 45). Which kind 
of moral decision should be taken is a question that neither for Popper 
nor for Gould falls inside the domain of science; rather, it has to be treat-
ed as pertaining to the domain of religion. On these matters—Popper 
thinks—“religion plays its most significant role in the life of man” (Popper 
2008, 45). In their thought, this represents a crucial difference between the 
two disciplines. The examples put forth by Gould are indicative of what the 
two authors have in mind:
Science can say nothing about the morality of morals. That is, the potential 
discovery by anthropologists that murder, infanticide, genocide, and xenophobia 
may have characterized many human societies, may have arisen preferentially 
in certain social situations, and may even be adaptively beneficial in certain 
contexts, offers no support whatever for the moral proposition that we ought 
to behave in such a matter”. (Gould 2002, 66)
Therefore, according to Gould and Popper each domain has a peculiar role 
and scope in human life, and each of the two disciplines tries to answer 
specific questions. To characterize the scientific enterprise Popper, in this 
lecture, refers to his explication of scientific practice and advancement. 
According to his epistemology, science proceeds not “by the accumula-
tion of knowledge” but “by way of revolutions”, via the amendment and 
substitution of previous knowledge for the new one (Popper 2008, 42). As 
a consequence—Popper’s thought goes—theories always remain hypotheses, 
because scientists will never reach the complete certainty of having solved 
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a problem (Popper 2008, 42–43). In this regard, it is helpful to quote another 
passage of his essay:
This does not imply that scientific method is no good, or that the scientific 
approach to matters must not be taken seriously. Just the opposite. Scientific 
knowledge is certainly the best we can have, and science does not only make 
revolutions: it also makes progress. It is perhaps the only field of human 
activity where there has been steady progress for a considerable time. For the 
scientist never accepts a revolutionary replacement of his theories without 
being thoroughly satisfied that the new theories offered are really better than 
the old ones. (Popper 2008, 42–43)
It is important to highlight this depiction of the scientific enterprise: Popper 
considers science as probably the sole human activity that has made a stable 
progress. According to him, this is a peculiarity of the scientific practice. 
And it seems that for religion the same does not hold. Popper was agnostic 
(Popper 2008, 49; Artigas 1998, 232), and Gould, in his book, defines himself 
in the same way (Gould 2002, 8–9). Despite this, Gould defends the position 
that the two fields of science and religion have the same value, and that both 
of them are equally necessary to conduct a genuinely human life. Regarding 
how the two authors conceive the term “religion”, both Popper and Gould 
associate it with ethics, or morality. But there is more to it. Indeed, for 
Gould religion cannot be totally reduced to moral principles. As we have 
already noted, according to him religion is, in addition, the field of inquiry 
that investigates the great questions concerning meaning and the final, 
ultimate aims. Human beings are called to search for the meaning of their 
lives, their own personal aims, and the morality of their actions. And each 
man has to conduct this quest within himself (Gould 2002, 177, 197, 204). 
The one depicted here is actually a very broad way of conceiving religion, 
as Gould himself admits:
This magisterium of ethical discussion and search for meaning includes several 
disciplines traditionally grouped under the humanities—much of philosophy, 
and part of literature and history, for example. But human societies have usually 
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centered the discourse of this magisterium upon an institution called “religion” 
(and manifesting, under this single name, an astonishing diversity of approaches, 
including all possible beliefs about the nature, or existence for that matter, of 
divine power; and all possible attitudes to freedom of discussion vs. obedience 
to unchangeable texts or doctrines). (Gould 2002, 55–57)
Karl Popper defines religion in a similar way:
I shall, however, maintain in what follows that we must extend the term “religion” 
even further than is usually done. If you call a man religious because he adheres 
to any of these different doctrines, then I maintain that we may also have to 
call him religious even if he does not adhere to any of the different recognized 
religions, provided that he has some faith which furnishes him with replies 
to those questions of practical life to which the various religions mentioned 
provide an answer for those who believe in them. Now of what kind are these 
questions? I maintain that they are fundamentally questions about the way we 
ought to act, about what we ought to aim at in this life, for ourselves as well as 
for mankind as a whole. (Popper 2008, 44)
After defining religion in this way, Gould is careful in adding that, obviously, 
atheists can and do behave according to ethical principles. But from this 
statement, it then follows that an atheist does not seem to be ruled out of 
this broad Gouldian characterization of religion3:
I most emphatically do not argue that ethical people must validate their 
standards by overt appeals to religion—for we give several names to the moral 
discourse of this necessary magisterium, and we all know that atheists can live 
in the most firmly principled manner, while hypocrites can wrap themselves 
in any flag, including (most prominently) the banners of God and country. But 
I do reiterate that religion has occupied the center of this magisterium in the 
traditions of most cultures. (Gould 2002, 57)
3 Harold Allen Orr has noted this in his review of Rocks of Ages for the Boston Review (Orr 
1999). 
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On this point Popper is even more explicit. He states that it is not possi-
ble to depict a clear contradistinction between religious and non-religious 
people, and in so saying he wants to overcome what is, according to him, 
the false dichotomy of “religion versus irreligion”:
I believe this more particularly in the case of those atheists who claimed with 
so much emphasis that they did not believe in any religion whatever: I maintain 
that these people were undoubtedly religious in precisely the same sense in 
which we attribute the possession of religion to those who believe in the many 
different creeds […]. My thesis is that although there may be degrees of faith, 
although faith may be very strong in some and rather weak in others, there is 
probably no man who is entirely without it. (Popper 2008, 45)
The problem with beliefs, according to Popper, lies elsewhere. In his view-
point, beliefs (religions) exist that are human or inhuman. And the difference 
between these two typologies is of a moral kind. That is, to appreciate or to 
devalue the “humanitarian idea of helping those who suffer” (Popper 2008, 
46). This idea represents the grounding basis of Popperian ethics: it is neces-
sary to lessen the suffering. Furthermore, science itself, as interpreted by this 
philosopher, has an ethical grounding (Artigas 1998). Indeed, here Popper 
states that even “the scientific devotion towards truth is itself a religious 
attitude” (Popper 2008, 47)4. Generally, in reading his text it seems that ethics 
is interpreted by him as a very broad kind of religiosity. He maintains that 
inhuman religions that lead to intolerance cannot be permitted, because 
they severely harm humankind. Popper characterizes inhuman religions as 
follows: “I have of course, the various brands of totalitarianism and racialism 
in mind. These are movements which with fervent belief try to destroy the 
greatest achievement of Christianity—the belief that we are all brethren; 
that all the differences between us are ultimately not very important at 
all; the belief, in short, in the unity of mankind” (Popper 2008, 46). In the 
same spirit, according to Gould religion is something that has to do with 
4 And he adds that this “is the attitude of serving and making sacrifices for an aim beyond 
ourselves. It is not only Christians who have been martyrs. There have been martyrs of 
science” (Popper 2008, 47).
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the unity of humankind: “I will […] construe as fundamentally religious 
(literally, binding us together) all moral discourse on principles that might 
activate the ideal of universal fellowship among people” (Gould 2002, 62).
Summing up, for both Gould and Popper religion can be characterized 
as an ethics, or a morality, for the human being, and as the enterprise that 
deals with the search for ultimate meanings. The discussions and decisions 
over the duties towards other human beings—and more generally over 
how to behave with the living and the nonliving world as well—are not, 
according to them, the subject-matter of science; they pertain instead to 
religion. Popper thus states that there cannot be any interference between 
science and religion (Popper 2008, 43). And Gould affirms—and this is 
a crucial statement to understand his proposal—that “facts and explanations 
developed under the magisterium of science cannot validate (or deny) the 
precepts of religion” (Gould 2002, 215).
2. Some Critiques of Gould’s NOMA
The reflections of Gould and Popper could appear, at first glance, to be 
able to differentiate effectively the domains of science and religion. But on 
a closer inspection, several troublesome issues appear. If, on the one hand, 
their proposal seems to be effective in distinguishing the “factual” from 
the “moral”, because it tries to be respectful of the already mentioned is/
ought divide, on the other it is exposed to several lines of criticism. Indeed, 
since the publication of Gould’s book, many critiques of his NOMA principle 
have been put forth. We will briefly review some of them, in order to have 
a clearer idea of what is at stake here. These critiques have been addressed 
to Gould but, because of the striking similarity we have detected between 
Popper and Gould on science and religion, the criticisms made in the case 
of the latter can, in our opinion, apply to the former as well.
One of the most radical critiques we have encountered is, without any 
doubt, the one formulated by biologist and philosopher Massimo Pigliucci. 
According to him, the NOMA model does not work for the simple fact 
that the magisterium of religion is “empty” (Pigliucci 2014, 167). He sees 
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religion as “consist[ing] of a mixture of superstition, mythology, and folk 
understanding” (Pigliucci 2014, 164)5. And, moving from this point, he then 
adds that the field of ethics can be tackled effectively by philosophy (i.e. 
moral philosophy): “Religion has no authority when it comes to an under-
standing of the natural world, as Gould himself of course stressed. But it has 
also no authority in the realm of morality, contra Gould’s somewhat naive 
and/or Pollyannaish view” (Pigliucci 2014, 167). If religion consists only in 
what Gould and Popper allege, then this trenchant critique is effective: in 
principle, an informed philosophical approach to topics such as morality and 
meaning could easily replace it. Moving to more moderate objections, the 
most widespread affirms, in a nutshell, that the definition that Gould makes 
of religion turns out to be both too vague and too restrictive regarding how 
it should (or should not) be conceived. This is because religion is usually 
considered as consisting of much more than what Gould indicates. The 
clearest instance of this is the fact that religions usually formulate some 
explicit ontological claims—or truth claims—regarding reality (Ruse 2010, 
232; 2015, 120). For present purposes, we can now leave aside the respective 
differences between disparate religions, and recall one truth claim that is 
basic—crucial indeed—for the three Abrahamic monotheisms (Christianity, 
Judaism, Islam) and for many other religions as well: God exists. Even the 
viability of a discussion on this statement turns out to be problematic if 
contextualized inside Gould’s proposal6. Furthermore, and closely related 
to it, the decoupling of this religious truth claim from the establishment 
5 Pigliucci, in commenting on the connection between folk wisdom and morality admits 
that “folk wisdom does go a good way toward helping us with ethical questions, and if re-
ligions are, to a point, a distillation of folk wisdom then they can certainly be useful in this 
respect”. But according to him “the problem […] is the alleged source of moral authority 
claimed by religions: one or more supernatural entities who simply dictate what is right 
or wrong” (Pigliucci 2014, 165).
6 At the beginning of his interview with Edward Zerin, Popper too decouples religion from 
the issue of God’s existence: “Although I am not a Jew by religion, I have come to the 
conclusion that there is great wisdom in the Jewish commandment ‘not to take the name 
of God in vain’. My objection to organized religion is that it tends to use the name of God 
in vain. I don’t know whether God exists or not. We may know how little we know, but this 
must not be turned or twisted into a positive knowledge of the existence of an unfathom-
able secret” (Popper 2008, 48–49). 
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of a morality and a meaning for life would generally be seen—from the 
religious viewpoint—as equally problematic. These two points have been 
clearly encapsulated by philosopher of science Ernan McMullin while 
commenting on Gould’s NOMA:
The restriction of religion to the realm of meaning and moral value leaves 
the status of God as an existent being in doubt. But unless God is, unless God 
is somehow involved in human affairs, it is not at all clear how religion can 
effectively serve the roles of conveyor of ultimate meaning and arbiter of moral 
value that Gould assigns to it. Perhaps a naturalized religion? (McMullin 2011, 
84; italics in original)
Biologist and theologian Denis Alexander, in an essay on “The Implications 
of Evolutionary Biology for Religious Belief”, follows this line of critique 
as well. According to him, many of the truth claims regarding reality that 
religious people are interested in asserting and defending are of an ethical 
kind, thus rendering, in this case, the distinction of the “is” from the “ought” 
not that clear-cut:
The partitioning of facts to the world of science and values to the world of 
religion is inconsistent with religious claims. Most religious believers would 
maintain that they hold to facts about the world, such as the fact that the 
human psyche is sinful or that rape is wrong. These are not scientific facts but, 
arguably, facts nonetheless. The neat facts/values partition does not therefore 
work in practice. (Alexander 2013, 184)
But the scope of the truth claims offered by religions is wider than that 
concerning moral issues, as already noted by mentioning the question of 
God’s existence. Another well-known critic of Gould, philosopher Daniel 
Dennett, recalls the discontent that arose from both sides of the divide 
after the publication of Gould’s book in his Breaking the Spell: Religion as 
a Natural Phenomenon (2006). In a short list of what—far from endorsing 
any of them—he defines as the “religious claims to factual truth and 
understanding of the natural world” (2006, 30), he lists the claim of God 
being the creator of the entire universe, the occurrence of miracles, and that 
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God is supposed to listen to prayers. Furthermore, he recalls the critique 
moved by the secularists too. According to them, Gould’s scheme “granted 
too much authority to religion in matters of ethics and meaning” (2006, 
30). As a result, in the end both advocates and critics of religion turn out 
to be dissatisfied with the depiction of this magisterium as put forth by 
Gould. In the words of Karl Giberson and Mariano Artigas, “supporters of 
religion find that the space Gould allocates to religion is simply too small 
for their religion to fit. On the other hand, opponents of religion want 
scientific warrant to challenge the truth-claims of religion” (Giberson and 
Artigas 2007, 80).
To sum up, it seems as if the neat independence that Gould advocates 
for his two magisteria is too simplistic a vision of what is actually a more 
complicated and intertwined relation. Far from promoting some sort of 
fusion of the two fields, or on the contrary a defense of a model of intrinsic 
and inevitable warfare, what we want to point to here—with this overview of 
some critiques to Gould—is that the relation between science and religion 
cannot be conceived in such an unproblematic way. Some tough and nuanced 
philosophical work is awaiting those who are interested in this challenging 
topic. This philosophical work has to tackle claims that come both from the 
magisterium of science and the magisterium of religion, and has to make 
sense of them. In this regard, the critics of Gould sustain that the NOMA 
theory is not able to fulfil this task. In the next section we offer another 
concrete example of this inability.
3. One More Problem for Gould’s NOMA
In Rocks of Ages Gould is very effective in criticizing those fundamental-
ist North American creationists that oppose and deny some aspects of 
contemporary science, and Darwin’s theory in particular, on the basis of 
a literalist reading of the Bible, and who historically have attempted—
without success—to introduce their ideas “into science curricula of public 
schools” (Gould 2002, 126). Their stance clearly flies in the face of Gould’s 
theory of NOMA (Gould 2002, 93), and, according to Barbour, falls inside 
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the conflict option (Barbour 1998, 82–84)7. But then Gould—as pointed out 
many times by his critics—goes too far, and interprets as a “violation of 
NOMA” (Gould 2002, 93) the acceptance or endorsement of some elements 
of religion that are usually held as crucial by theologians and believers. As 
a clear example of this, we can consider a topic that Gould recalls in Rocks 
of Ages, and that he tackles at length elsewhere, in other popular books 
(Gould 2002, 179–180, 206; 1989; 1996): the positioning of man in the 
wider context of the evolutionary scenario, in the light of the contingency 
of evolution. This concept—evolutionary contingency—conveys the idea 
that natural history is in general unpredictable, and that the appearance 
of our species, from the evolutionary standpoint, has been an “unexpected” 
event (Pievani 2009; 2011). In Gould’s words, we are “a “thing so small” in 
a vast universe, a wildly improbable evolutionary event, and not the nub 
of universal purpose” (Gould 2002, 206). But given this—as philosopher of 
biology Michael Ruse has underlined in commenting on Gould’s book—the 
theologians or, more generally, the men of faith must try to harmonize this 
recognition, if possible, with a fundamental theological concept, that of 
man being “made in the image of God”, of his being wanted, and expected 
by Him:
Crucially, it is part of Judaeo-Christian theology that humans are not simply 
animals like any other, nor is our existence on this earth simply a matter of 
contingency. We are made in the image of God (whatever that might mean) 
and, although the universe may not exist for our special benefit, we humans 
7 Gould, interestingly, refuses to locate this phenomenon inside the warfare stance, and 
offers another interpretation of it by referring to his NOMA theory: “The forceful and 
persistent attempt by young-earth creationists to insinuate their partisan and minority 
theological dogma into the science curricula of American public schools cannot be read, 
in any legitimate way, as an episode in any supposedly general warfare between science 
and religion. If the issue must be dichotomized at all, the two sides might be character-
ized as supporters versus opponents of NOMA” (Gould 2002, 128). This judgement can 
be better understood in the light of Gould’s distinction between the particular kind of 
creationism criticized by him and religion as generally considered. This distinction has 
been suggestively described, in biblical terms, by Patricia H. Kelley as “Gould’s winnowing 
fork”: Gould “winnow[ed] the chaff of creationism from the wheat of religion” (Kelley 
2009, 173). 
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do have a rather special place in the scheme of things […]. I simply do not see 
how the Jew or Christian can or should leave matters untouched at this point, 
passively accepting the science as given and gutting the religion of absolutely 
central content: evolution is contingent and hence we humans cannot make 
claim to special status. (Ruse 1999)
This issue is a thorny one, and lies at the forefront of the interdisciplinary 
dialogue. But again, Gould’s proposal turns out to be, in this particular 
context also, inadequate to handle it. As philosopher Mikael Stenmark has 
underscored, an inconsistency emerges in Gould’s assessment of this topic:
What is puzzling is how Gould as a scientist could maintain that a religious belief 
in the ultimate meaning of human life ought to be rejected and at the same 
time proclaim that ‘facts and explanations developed under the magisterium 
of science cannot validate (or deny) the precepts of religion’. These claims are 
not compatible (Stenmark 2004a, 188; italics in original).
A different solution has to be searched for in order to disentangle this 
issue. From the theological viewpoint, man has got a special status, and his 
appearance has been decided by God. But simply dismissing these statements 
in the light of our best evolutionary account of how we came about would 
amputate Christian theology (and many other religions as well) of a fun-
damental component: that is, of one of those “factual claims” (Ruse 2015, 
112) that religions formulate and defend. Some epistemological mediation 
should be attempted. To be sure, this should be done without ignoring the 
actuality of the contingency of evolution. But at the same time, the task 
should be to try to offer positive arguments, drawing from metaphysics and 
theology (Stenmark 2004a, 191), on the effectiveness of a supposed creator 
in obtaining what he wants from a contingent evolutionary path8.
8 For an excellent instance of this see McMullin (1998), and see also the comment on this 
work by Stoeger (2013). On this topic see also Stenmark (2004a, 189–191).
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4. Gould’s NOMA inside Barbour’s Scheme
It might be useful at this point to consider how Gould’s viewpoint can be 
located inside Barbour’s scheme. Patricia Kelley, in analyzing his theoretical 
proposal, has shown that two of the four options can promptly be excluded 
(Kelley 2009, 171–188). In fact, Gould himself criticizes them at length in 
his book. As far as his dismissal of the conflict thesis is concerned, we have 
already remarked that this is a position shared by both Gould and Popper. 
Indeed, Gould devotes a part of Rocks of Ages to summarizing and criticizing 
the warfare view. In so doing, he recalls the origins of what is, in his evalu-
ation, a “false model” (Gould 2002, 111) that depicts the relation between 
science and religion as a “warfare between two inexorably opposed forces 
vying for the same turf” (Gould 2002, 102): it harks back to the nineteenth 
century, and more precisely to the publication of Andrew Dickson White’s 
A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, and of John 
William Draper’s History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science (Gould 
2002, 99–110, 118–124). Gould defends his dismissal of this model even 
in the face of the fact that historically—as he himself reminds us—“overt 
struggle” actually occurred (Gould 2002, 103). In addition, Gould dismisses 
the fourth option too, the one labeled integration. He calls this attitude 
“syncretic” (Gould 2002, 212; Kelley 2009, 176), and considers as a pertinent 
example of it a congress on interdisciplinary issues on the occasion of 
which—according to him—an attempt of this kind was undertaken (Gould 
2002, 208–222). Amongst the proposals offered by the syncretic school, 
Gould criticizes and dismisses those versions of the argument from design 
for God’s existence that take as their starting point the alleged “fine-tun-
ing” of the physical constants of the universe that permit the existence of 
intelligent life, and from this try to infer a supernatural fine-tuner (Gould 
2002, 218–220; Kelley 2009, 176–177)9. By referring to Barbour’s fourfold 
9 It is interesting to note that Karl Popper too in his lecture criticizes those who think 
that the developments of science support or confirm particular religious claims: “We hear 
statements, made by the defenders of religion as well as by certain scientists, to the ef-
fect that modern scientific developments can be interpreted as supporting religious faith 
rather than as questioning it; and when I speak about the nineteenth-century problem 
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typology as applied by Kelley on Gould’s theorization, we can place his 
proposal inside the independence stance (Kelley 2009, 175; Ruse 2015, 
232). Moreover, Kelley also notes that—due to his frequent call for a deep 
dialogue between the two magisteria—Gould’s overall proposal “appears 
to also share some aspects of Barbour’s third category” (Kelley 2009, 175). 
Indeed, in putting his thought to paper Gould repeatedly seems to try to 
move beyond the idea of a complete independence of the two domains. In 
various passages of his book Gould states that science and religion, without 
trespassing the respective borders, should nonetheless try to engage in 
a conversation: “NOMA seeks no false fusion, but urges two distinct sides 
to stay on their own turf, develop their best solutions to designated parts of 
life’s totality, and, above all, to keep talking to each other in mutual respect, 
and with an optimistic forecast about the value of reciprocal enlightenment” 
(Gould 2002, 211; and see also 5, 92, 148). Furthermore, in characterizing 
the two magisteria Gould maintains that they encompass two typical human 
attitudes. Science—as already recalled above—is by him depicted as the 
quest for an objective knowledge of the natural world. And religion—in 
Gould’s interpretation of it—is the quest for the meaning of each and every 
human life, as well as for the moral principles that can guide and enlighten 
human actions (Gould 2002, 175). For this reason, according to Gould the 
knowledge earned by each magisterium should integrate in the personal 
life of every man:
All human beings must pay at least rudimentary attention to both magisteria 
of religion and science, whatever we choose to name these domains of ethical 
and factual inquiry. Mere existence may be sustained by the minimal concern 
caricatured above. But real success—at least in the old-fashioned sense of 
genuine stature—requires serious engagement with the deep and difficult issues 
of the tension between religion and science I do not wish to imply, as some may think, 
that in the twentieth century this problem has disappeared because it now turns out that 
science supports religious belief. My point is entirely different. Supposing that science is 
accepted as supporting religion—then if at a certain stage of its development it turns out 
that it agrees with some religious doctrines and we adopt them for that reason, we would 
also have to accept the refutation of those doctrines by science, if at some other stage of 
its development science should arrive at a different opinion” (Popper 2008, 42).
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of both magisteria. The magisteria will not fuse; so each of us must integrate 
these distinct components into a coherent view of life. If we succeed, we gain 
something truly “more precious that rubies”, and dignified by one of the most 
beautiful words in any language: wisdom. (Gould 2002, 58)
Doubts remain, however, on how these two magisteria—when encapsulated 
in Gould’s theory—could effectively integrate inside each thinking man, 
given the many tensions and epistemological dead ends that, following some 
of his most authoritative critics, we have recalled in this essay. It is true that 
Gould sees himself as an advocate of the dialogue, envisioning a theory of 
NOMA always undertaking a “tough-minded and insistent search” for it 
(Gould 2002, 221). But the critique that can be extended to him at this point 
is that, given the way in which his theory is articulated, and the theoretical 
restrictions imposed by it on religion, this alleged dialogue will in the end 
turn out to be sterile, and—as we have shown with the case of evolutionary 
contingency—incapable of tackling effectively some core problematic issues.
Conclusion
In this paper we have offered a brief comparison of the thought of Stephen 
Jay Gould and Karl Popper on science and religion. On this topic, they 
share essentially the same position. This exposes Popper’s ideas to the 
same lines of criticism that have been extended to Gould, and that we have 
recalled in section two and three. To end with a positive note, we want to 
stress the significance of Gould’s and Popper’s efforts in trying to make 
sense of diverse human enterprises without criticizing or even dismissing 
the one in order to fully value the other. In an era when polarizations and 
false dichotomies are sometimes regarded as easy ways to solve complex 
issues, their effort has to be met with gratitude. Unfortunately, Gould’s 
proposal turns out in the end to be too simplistic, and the criticisms of it 
are generally well posited and pertinent. We nonetheless believe—and in 
this we agree with Gould—that the conflict and the integration stances are 
not going to lead to significant results in interdisciplinary issues of this 
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kind, and must be avoided. In order to achieve a fruitful exchange between 
science and religion, we should seriously take into consideration the two 
other emplacements identified by Barbour, and value them: the one of 
independence and the one of dialogue. In this regard, as we have recalled 
in section four, Gould’s framework presents aspects typical of both the 
independence and the dialogue positions. It could be useful, in our view, 
to move from this emplacement—independence with dialogue—and try to 
structure this theoretical position in a way that is capable of overcoming 
the epistemological limits and standoffs that emerge from Gould’s and 
Popper’s proposals. We believe that the dialogue between science and 
religion must start by preserving and safeguarding their independence. The 
challenge that lies ahead is to do that in a way that is respectful of both 
science and religion, of their respective methodologies as well as of their 
specific contents, in order to tackle more effectively the thorny issues that 
lie at their borderlands.
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